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 In a recent judgment, the German Federal Constitutional Court held 
that it was unconstitutional to require every person's sex to be entered 
on the birth register, without providing for a third option for intersex 
persons. This article examines the intersex judgment in view of the 
Court's earlier jurisprudence on the rights of trans persons. It argues 
that this judgment was enabled, to a significant extent, by the fluid 
understanding of sex and gender identity shown in those judgments, 
and by the elaboration in those cases of the relationship between 
sexual freedom, human dignity and equality. It also comments on the 
possible relevance of the intersex judgment for South Africa, in view of 
some of the parallels and differences between German and South 
African constitutional jurisprudence. 
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1 Introduction 
In a judgment delivered in October 2017 (hereafter the "intersex judgment"), 
the First Senate of the German Federal Constitutional Court (hereafter "the 
GFCC") held that it was unconstitutional to require every person's sex to be 
entered on the birth register, without providing for a third option for intersex 
persons.1 The judgment has been hailed as a milestone in the protection of 
intersex persons, which constitutes a radical challenge to binary 
conceptions of sex and gender.2 Despite the novelty of the judgment, I argue 
in this article that it shows certain continuities with some of the Court's 
earlier judgments in cases dealing with the rights of trans persons.3 First of 
all, the fluid understanding of sex and gender identity shown in these 
judgments arguably helped pave the way for the recognition of a third 
gender.4 Secondly, the intersex judgment drew on the Court's elaboration 
in these cases of the importance of sexual intimacy and self-determination 
as ingredients of the constitutional right to the free development of the 
personality, read with the constitutional guarantee of human dignity. It also 
                                            
*  Henk Botha. BLC LLB (Pretoria) LLM (Columbia) LLD (Pretoria). Department of 
Public Law, Stellenbosch University, South Africa. Email: hbotha@sun.ac.za. I am 
indebted to the National Research Foundation and the Alexander von Humboldt 
Foundation for financial assistance. Thanks to Christoph Möllers for his hospitality 
during a research stay at Humboldt University, Dominik Steiger and Jelena Bäumler 
for helpful conversations, Johndré Barnes for research assistance, and the 
anonymous referees for helpful comments. The responsibility for errors remains my 
own. 
1  1 BvR 2019/16, judgment of 10 October 2017 (hereafter the "intersex judgment"). 
2  See generally Mangold 2017 http://verfassungsblog.de/nichtmann-nicht-frau-nicht-
nichts-ein-verfassungsblog-symposium. 
3  I use the term "trans" to refer both to transsexual and transgender persons. 
4  A brief note on my use of the terms "sex" and "gender": I recognise that a conflation 
of terms like sex, gender and sexual orientation can have devastating consequences 
for sexual minorities. This would be the case where gender is conflated with crude 
biological notions of sex, for example where the marriage of a trans person who 
underwent surgery to become a woman is not recognised because she cannot bear 
children, or where a trans person's sexual orientation is used to determine his or her 
sex or gender. See Visser and Picarra 2012 SAJHR 508-510, 530-531. However, 
the traditional way of distinguishing between sex and gender has itself been the 
subject of criticism. Some feminists and queer theorists point out that the idea that 
sex is something wholly natural or biological, whereas gender refers to the cultural 
meanings, roles and expectations associated with sex, hides the extent to which sex 
itself is culturally and discursively constructed. Butler Gender Trouble 10-12. It would 
therefore be a mistake to assume that the legal classification of intersex persons 
deals solely with questions of sex and is unrelated to gender. To do so, would be to 
revert to a dangerous essentialism, which reduces complex legal, moral and social 
questions to technical medical issues. The GFCC's intersex judgment itself 
recognises that the sex description of intersex persons cannot and should not be 
separated from their gender identity. For these reasons, I often refer to sex and 
gender (or sex and gender identity) together, rather than trying to separate them 
strictly. 
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relied on the understanding of the relationship between freedom, dignity and 
equality developed in the trans judgments.  
The article starts with a summary of the most salient aspects of the intersex 
judgment. It then considers the Court's understanding of sex and gender 
identity in that judgment and in the earlier trans cases. Next, it examines the 
understandings of freedom, and of freedom's relationship with dignity and 
equality, which inform those judgments. After that, it comments briefly on 
the possible relevance of the intersex judgment for South Africa, with 
reference to some of the parallels and differences between German and 
South African constitutional jurisprudence. The article ends with tentative 
observations on the transformative possibilities – and limits – of the 
judgments under discussion. 
2 The intersex judgment 
The case concerned a challenge to the constitutionality of a provision in the 
Civil Status Act (Personenstandsgesetz) of 2007, in terms of which a child's 
gender must be entered onto the birth register. In cases where neither a 
male nor a female gender can be assigned, an entry can be made without 
specifying the child's gender. The complainant in this case had, on the basis 
of a chromosome analysis, requested the registration office to amend the 
gender assigned to her at birth from "female" to "inter/diverse", or 
alternatively "diverse". The request was rejected on the ground that the 
legislation did not make provision for a third gender. Even though the 
legislation had been amended to create the possibility to leave a person's 
gender unspecified, it did not provide for a third option such as intersex or 
diverse. After several unsuccessful court challenges, the complainant 
approached the GFCC. The challenge rested on two grounds. First, it was 
argued that the refusal to allow a third option, besides male and female, 
violated the right to free development of the personality in terms of article 
2(1), read with the guarantee of human dignity in article 1(1) of the Basic 
Law. Secondly, it was contended that it constituted discrimination based on 
sex, in contravention of article 3(3), and infringed the right to equality before 
the law, as guaranteed in article 3(1).  
The GFCC referred in its judgment to the history of the legislative 
amendment that created the possibility of not entering a person's gender on 
the birth register. The UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women, in its comment of 12 February 2009, requested Germany 
to enter into a dialogue with NGOs representing intersex and trans people 
in order to get a better understanding of their claims and to take effective 
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action to protect their human rights. The government then asked the 
German Council for Ethics to draft a report on the position of intersex 
persons in Germany. The Council concluded in its report that forcing 
intersex persons to be categorised as either male or female violated their 
personality right and right to equal treatment. It recommended the creation 
of a third gender category, referred to as "other", and made 
recommendations relating to the amendment of a person's gender entry. It 
further submitted that the ends sought to be achieved through the recording 
of a person's gender on the birth register needed to be examined in order 
to establish whether it was at all necessary. The federal government 
committed itself to addressing these issues, but was of the opinion that they 
were too complex to be resolved in the short term. A provision was added 
to the Civil Status Act, which made it possible to leave a person's gender 
unspecified, and a process was envisaged to consider introducing more 
comprehensive changes.5 
The Court held that article 2(1), read with article 1(1) of the Basic Law, 
protects the gender identity of persons who can be classified as neither male 
nor female.6 Article 2(1), which guarantees the right to the free development 
of the personality, entails both a general right to freedom and a general 
personality right. The latter seeks inter alia to secure the basic conditions 
under which persons can develop their individuality.7 The Court noted that 
gender classification is of central significance for every person's self-
understanding and for how they are perceived by others.8 To require every 
person to be registered as either male or female is to deprive those who fall 
outside of that binary of the opportunity to be identified in a way which 
corresponds to their gender identity. The failure to provide for them is not 
rectified through the option of leaving a child's gender unspecified, or of 
subsequently scrapping their gender classification. Far from giving positive 
recognition to an alternative gender identity, such an entry creates the 
impression that those concerned are lacking in gender, or that their gender 
identity has not been clarified yet.9 The law thus has a negative impact on 
the development of the personality of intersex persons who do not identify 
as either male or female. Given the central importance of the Civil Status 
Act to a person's legally relevant identity, the Court held that the requirement 
of gender identification on the birth register, together with the failure to 
provide a third option which corresponds more closely to their gender 
                                            
5  See the discussion at paras 3-7 of the intersex judgment. 
6  Paragraph 36 of the intersex judgment. 
7  Paragraph 38 of the intersex judgment. 
8  Paragraph 39 of the intersex judgment. 
9  Paragraph 43 of the intersex judgment. 
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identity, violates the right to the free development of their personality. It 
impairs their ability to remain true to their gender identity in public and to be 
recognised by others for who they are.10  
The Court further held that the failure to provide for a third gender amounts 
to discrimination based on sex. Article 3(3) of the Basic Law protects not 
only men and women against gender discrimination, but also persons who 
do not identify themselves as male or female.11 That is despite the fact that 
article 3(2) refers specifically to the equal rights of men and women, and 
that it is unlikely that the framers of the constitution in 1949 envisaged the 
recognition of a third gender.12 The Court also rejected the argument that 
the failure to include "gender identity" in article 3(3) points to an intention 
not to proscribe discrimination against those who do not identify themselves 
as male or female. The reason why gender identity was not added to the list 
of grounds of discrimination through a constitutional amendment was that it 
was believed to have been covered already by the reference to "sex".13 The 
impugned provisions treat such persons unequally to the extent that, unlike 
men and women, they cannot be registered in accordance with their gender. 
They must be registered as either male or female, even if they do not identify 
with those designations, or be consigned to an entry which creates the 
impression that they are genderless.14 The Court stated that article 3(3) is 
aimed at protecting members of groups that are endangered by structural 
discrimination, and that persons who identify neither with a male nor with a 
female gender identity experience high levels of vulnerability in a society in 
which gender tends to be thought of in binary terms.15  
The limitation of articles 2(1) and 3(3) was found to be unjustified. In the first 
place, the Court held that the Basic Law itself does not entrench a strictly 
binary conception of sex or gender. Even though article 3(2) speaks of 
"men" and "women", and promotes the elimination of discrimination against 
women, it does not rule out alternative approaches to the relationship 
between gender and civil status. It neither necessitates treating gender as 
a component of civil status, nor opposes the recognition of a gender identity 
                                            
10  Paragraphs 45-48 of the intersex judgment. 
11  Paragraphs 56, 58 of the intersex judgment. 
12  Paragraphs 60, 61 of the intersex judgment. 
13  Paragraph 62 of the intersex judgment. Art 3 was amended in 1994, when sentences 
were added to arts 3(2) and 3(3). The former obliges the state to promote the actual 
implementation of equal rights for men and women, while the latter prohibits 
disfavouring any person because of disability. 
14  Paragraph 57 of the intersex judgment. 
15  Paragraph 59 of the intersex judgment. 
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beyond male and female.16 Secondly, the limitation cannot be justified with 
reference to the interests of third parties. The recognition of a third gender 
would not in any way affect the status of persons – including ones whose 
sexual development is atypical – who identify themselves as male or female. 
The idea is not to force anyone to identify with a third gender, but rather to 
increase the number of options available to persons with different variations 
of sexual development.17 Thirdly, the limitation cannot be justified with 
reference to the bureaucratic and financial costs involved in enabling other 
gender categories. The legislature in any event also has the option of 
relinquishing gender as a determinant of civil status, which would involve no 
additional costs.18 Finally, enabling alternative gender options is not 
precluded by the state's interest in maintaining order. It is true that, in a 
system in which gender plays a role in the legal classification of persons 
and the attribution of rights and duties, uncertainties could arise as a result 
of the introduction of a third option. However, such difficulties already exist 
where, as in Germany, the option exists of leaving a person's gender 
unspecified.19 
The Court gave the legislature until 31 December 2018 to come up with a 
new arrangement. It emphasised that there are a number of options that 
could be considered. These include dispensing with a gender entry 
altogether, or creating the option of a third gender category beyond male 
and female. The Court made it clear that, if the latter option were to be 
chosen, the existing possibility of leaving one's gender open should also be 
retained.20 
3 Sex and gender identity 
What is most striking about this judgment is its rejection of a binary 
understanding of sex, in terms of which all persons are to be identified as 
either male or female. In the Court's view, the right to the free development 
of the personality, together with the guarantee of human dignity, entitles all 
persons to be identified in a way that corresponds to their gender identity, 
whether that is male, female or something else. Moreover, discrimination on 
the ground of sex is given a wide interpretation to include discrimination 
                                            
16  Paragraph 50 of the intersex judgment. 
17  Paragraph 51 of the intersex judgment. 
18  Paragraph 52 of the intersex judgment. 
19  Paragraphs 53-54 of the intersex judgment. 
20  Paragraphs 51, 65 of the intersex judgment. 
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against persons whose gender identity cannot be captured in terms of the 
male/female binary.  
The recognition of a third gender is a new departure, which could have far-
reaching implications for a legal system in which gender is an important 
determinant of personal status and the rights and obligations flowing from 
that status. Even though the Court, in a series of judgments, upheld the right 
of trans persons to sexual self-determination, these judgments still took the 
idea of a binary system of sexual classification for granted.21 Despite this, 
that jurisprudence helped lay the groundwork for the Court's reasoning in 
the intersex judgment. The trans judgments are characterised by a fluid 
understanding of sex and gender, which recognises that it is not simply a 
matter of a person's physical sexual attributes. In the first of these 
judgments, the Court held that trans persons who have undergone sex-
change operations are entitled to an amendment of the original entry of their 
gender in the birth register. The judgment noted that the view that a person's 
sex can be determined purely on the basis of bodily sexual characteristics, 
and that it is something inborn and unvarying, is questionable in view of 
medical findings relating to psychosexuality. It stated that it is scientifically 
proven that there is a wide variety of forms of somatic intersexuality, and 
that there are individual cases in which there is a strong disassociation, as 
far as a person's sex is concerned, between form and actuality, or between 
a person's physiological and psychological makeup.22 Despite its rejection 
of a strictly binary approach, the Court nevertheless held on to certain 
essentialist assumptions, some of which were rejected in subsequent 
cases. For example, it stated that trans individuals simply wish to bring their 
physiological reality in accordance with their psychological makeup, that 
they are not interested in having same-sex relationships, and that, once 
their sex has been altered through surgery, they want to be able to have 
intercourse with a partner of the opposite sex.23  
In subsequent cases, the Court stressed the importance of enabling trans 
persons to experiment with new gender roles before they decide to have 
sex-change operations. For instance, it held that a legislative provision 
which allows trans persons to effect a name change to reflect their own 
experienced gender identity was unconstitutional to the extent that it 
excluded persons under the age of 25. The Court reasoned that it is 
particularly important for young trans individuals to be able to assume new 
                                            
21  See eg BVerfGE 128, 109 (2011) paras 60-62, 70, 72.  
22  BVerfGE 49, 286 (1978) paras 50-51. 
23  Paragraphs 52, 54 of the intersex judgment. 
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gender roles, to gain confidence and to be shielded in the workplace and 
everyday life from stressful situations arising from the discrepancy between 
their official gender classification and how they experience their gender 
identity.24 In other cases, too, it emphasised that gender depends not only 
on persons’ physical characteristics but also on their psychological makeup 
and own experienced gender.25  
The Court also disowned its previous reasoning concerning the relationship 
between gender identity and sexual orientation, and held that persons’ 
sexual orientation cannot be used to determine their gender. It accordingly 
invalidated a provision in terms of which trans persons whose name had 
been changed forfeited the changed name which reflected their own 
experienced gender identity upon entering into a legally recognised union 
with someone of the same sex. (For instance, in terms of this provision a 
trans person whose gender classification on the birth register was male, but 
who identified with the female sex and adopted a female name, had to revert 
back to the original male name upon marrying a woman.) It noted that, 
according to scientific research, a significant percentage of trans persons 
prefer same-sex over heterosexual relations. The assumption that a turn to 
same-sex relations casts doubt on a person's transsexuality is not 
warranted.26 The Court further pointed out that the differentiation in question 
between trans persons who did and did not undergo sex-change surgery 
rested on the assumption that all trans individuals experience their genitals 
as an error of nature which can be corrected only through a sex-change 
operation. This assumption is no longer tenable. Recent scientific findings 
show that the question whether a sex-change operation is required cannot 
be answered on the basis of broad generalisations, but must be determined 
within the context of each individual case.27  
These later judgments show a keen awareness of the variability of sex, 
gender identity and sexual orientation. Far from portraying trans people as 
a homogeneous group, the judgments recognise that they are characterised 
by a variety of attitudes and needs relating to whether or not to undergo a 
sex-change operation, the sex of their partners, etc. This growing sensitivity 
to the diversity of the experiences and identities of trans people arguably 
helped pave the way for the recognition of a third gender beyond male and 
female. Once it is recognised that transsexuality comes in many different 
                                            
24  BVerfGE 88, 87 (1993) paras 40, 41. 
25  BVerfGE 116, 243 (2006) para 64. 
26  BVerfGE 115, 1 (2005) paras 54, 67. 
27  Paragraphs 65-66 of the intersex judgment. Also see BVerfGE 128, 109 (2011) para 
66. 
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shapes and is not simply an accident of nature which is, in all cases, to be 
rectified through surgery, it becomes easier to see sex and gender identity 
in terms of a spectrum, rather than a sharp male/female dichotomy. From 
there, it is perhaps not such a long stretch to recognising that there are 
individuals who do not fit into either of these categories, and that new 
categories may need to be invented. In accordance with this emphasis on 
diversity, the third gender mooted by the Court in its 2017 judgment is itself 
characterised by a wide variety of internal differences. Referring as it does 
to intersex people, it includes individuals who, for a diversity of reasons, fall 
outside the typical definitions of male or female. These reasons include 
sexual or reproductive organs that do not fit the usual definitions of male or 
female, a discrepancy between sex organs and chromosomes or between 
internal and external sex organs, and unusual chromosome 
configurations.28  
A second parallel between the Court's trans and intersex judgments lies in 
the emphasis on personal experience and choice. In the trans cases the 
Court held that persons’ physical characteristics, psychological makeup and 
own experience of gender identity all play a role in determining their gender. 
In the intersex judgment it stressed that if legislation were to create a third 
gender category, intersex persons should, in addition to that option, be 
given the choice to be classified as male or female. These 
acknowledgments of the importance of personal experience and choice are 
not tantamount to a denial of the biological, social and environmental factors 
which limit the capacity of individuals to develop their personality and 
exercise freedom. The judgments are characterised by a keen awareness 
of the vulnerability of members of sexual minorities, and the need for the 
state to create an environment in which their freedom can flourish. On this 
view, respect for the dignity, equality and freedom of sexual minorities can 
be safeguarded only through laws that secure equal recognition for different 
forms of sexuality. Freedom is conceived in relational, not metaphysical 
terms: it depends on laws and structures of recognition that allow 
individuals, including those who are differently sexed, to assume different 
sexual roles and identities, and that recognise their intrinsic dignity and 
worth irrespective of their sex, gender or sexual orientation.29  
                                            
28  See Anon Date Unknown https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/001669.ht Intersex 
Society of North America Date Unknown http://www.isna.org/faq/what_is_intersex. 
29  On the distinction between metaphysical and relational or political understandings of 
freedom, see Cornell At the Heart of Freedom 64; Bishop and Woolman "Freedom 
and Security of the Person" 40/11-40/15. 
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4 Dignity, equality and freedom 
In the intersex judgment the GFCC held that the requirement that every 
person must be registered as either male or female was inconsistent with 
the constitutional guarantees of the free development of the personality, 
human dignity and equality. These three constitutional provisions also 
featured prominently in the trans cases. A number of laws and/or decisions 
were found to violate article 2(1) (free development of the personality), 
together with article 1(1) (human dignity). These included the failure to 
amend the gender entry of a trans person who had a sex-change operation 
on the birth register,30 and a provision in terms of which trans persons 
forfeited their changed name upon entering a same-sex relationship.31 The 
requirement that married trans persons who had a sex-change operation 
had to get divorced in order to gain official legal recognition of their changed 
sex, was invalidated on the same grounds.32 The same goes for the 
requirement that a trans person should have had a sex-change operation 
and be incapable of reproduction in order to qualify to enter a same-sex civil 
union.33  
Violations of article 3(1) (equality before the law) were found where certain 
categories of trans persons were excluded from benefits under the 
Transsexual Act (Transsexuellengesetz) of 1980. Two of these cases dealt 
with age restrictions: in the first, trans persons under the age of 25 could not 
have their gender changed on the birth register, even if they had a sex-
change operation and complied with all the other requirements,34 while in 
the second, persons under 25 were excluded from the right to effect a name 
change.35 In a third case, some categories of foreigners who were legally 
and not only temporarily in Germany were barred from changing their name 
or gender.36 In all three cases, articles 1(1) and 2(1) featured prominently in 
the Court's reasoning. The impact of the restrictions on the human dignity 
and right to the free development of the personality of young trans persons 
played an important part in determining the level of scrutiny and the margin 
of discretion left to the legislature. The Court held that the more the unequal 
treatment of different groups of persons restricts those affected in the 
exercise of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms, the more difficult it 
                                            
30  BVerfGE 49, 286 (1978). 
31  BVerfGE 115, 1 (2005). 
32  BVerfGE 121, 175 (2008). In addition, the Court in this case relied on art 6(1), which 
provides that marriage and the family shall enjoy the special protection of the state. 
33  BVerfGE 128, 109 (2011). 
34  BVerfGE 60, 123 (1982). 
35  BVerfGE 88, 87 (1993). 
36  BVerfGE 116, 243 (2006). 
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becomes to justify the measures in question. Where, as in these cases, they 
have a fundamental impact on the personality rights and capacity for self-
actualisation of certain categories of people, a strict form of scrutiny is called 
for.37  
The right to the free development of the personality thus plays a central part 
in cases involving the rights of sexual minorities. It does so as a self-
standing right, in combination with the constitutional guarantee of human 
dignity, and in helping to determine the intensity of scrutiny under the 
equality clause. In the view of the Court, article 1(1) protects the dignity of a 
person as she becomes aware of and understands herself as an 
individual.38 Article 2(1), together with article 1(1), protects the narrow 
personal sphere of life, including the intimate sexual sphere, which 
comprises the right to sexual self-determination. It thus also refers to 
discovering and recognising one's own gender identity and sexual 
orientation.39  
This has important implications for a person's civil status and the rights and 
duties flowing from that status. First of all, individuals have the right to be 
assigned a gender which takes account of their physical characteristics as 
well as their psychological makeup and own experienced gender.40 
Secondly, they are entitled to respect for their name. A name is both a 
means through which individuals discover their identity and develop their 
individuality, and an expression of their experienced and acquired gender 
identity.41 To require trans persons to be known by names which do not 
correspond to their gender identity as they experience it violates their right 
to sexual self-determination. It also intrudes into their intimate sphere, as it 
highlights the discrepancy between their official gender and the gender with 
which they identify, and forces them to reveal their transsexuality to third 
parties.42 Thirdly, article 2(1), in combination with article 1(1), guarantees 
the right to enter into a permanent intimate relationship with a person of 
one's choice, and to secure legal recognition for that relationship.43 In the 
view of the Court, reserving the institution of marriage for opposite-sex 
couples and the civil union for couples who share the same sex serves 
                                            
37  BVerfGE 60, 123 (1982) paras 40-42; BVerfGE 88, 87 (1993) paras 34-41; BVerfGE 
116, 243 (2006) paras 58, 60. In the last-mentioned case, the Court held that the 
provision in question violated art 3(1) in combination with arts 2(1) and 1(1). 
38  BVerfGE 49, 286 (1978) para 50. 
39  BVerfGE 115, 1 (2005) para 47. 
40  BVerfGE 49, 286 (1978) para 50; BVerfGE 115, 1 (2005) para 50. 
41  BVerfGE 115, 1 (2005) para 48. 
42  BVerfGE 116, 243 (2006) paras 64-65.  
43  BVerfGE 128, 109 (2011) para 53. 
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important objectives and is not in itself unconstitutional. However, it would 
violate the right to sexual self-determination and intimacy if individuals' sex, 
for the purpose of establishing whether they are entitled to marry or enter a 
civil union, were to be established solely with reference to their external 
sexual characteristics and without taking account of their own experienced 
gender, as confirmed by medical opinion.44  
Fourthly, individuals are not to be placed in a situation in which they must 
sacrifice rights that are fundamental to their personhood in order to be true 
to their own experienced gender identity or sexual orientation. For instance, 
the Court held that it is impermissible to force trans persons who are gay or 
lesbian to choose between retaining a name that corresponds to their 
gender identity or entering into a legally recognised union with a person of 
their choice.45 It is similarly unconstitutional to require married trans persons 
to get divorced in order to gain official legal recognition of their changed sex, 
as both gender identity and the decision to be married go to the existential 
core of the personal sphere of intimacy and self-determination.46 The Court 
further found that the requirement that trans persons must undergo a sex-
change operation and must be permanently incapable of reproduction to be 
able to enter a same-sex civil union impermissibly places them before the 
alternative either to compromise their right to bodily integrity under article 
2(2) or to get married, as opposed to entering a civil union. The problem 
with the second option is that marriage contradicts gay and lesbian trans 
persons' own experience of their gender and sexual orientation. The 
provision in question thus forces individuals to choose between their bodily 
integrity and their sexual self-determination and intimacy.47 
These judgments place great emphasis on the right of individuals to shape 
their gender identities in accordance with their own experience and self-
understanding. This is not simply a right to be left alone, but a right to 
positive legal recognition of every person's capacity for self-definition and 
self-realisation. Individuals are entitled to experiment with and embrace 
gender identities that defy mainstream norms, and to be recognised by 
others for who they are. From a legal perspective, who they are is to be 
determined not in terms of a rigid system of binary classifications, but with 
reference to their own embodied experience and self-understanding. The 
right of individuals to determine their own gender identity can be limited in 
pursuance of a legitimate objective and subject to the proportionality 
                                            
44  BVerfGE 128, 109 (2011) para 54. 
45  BVerfGE 115, 1 (2005) para 53. 
46  BVerfGE 121, 175 (2008) paras 41, 53, 54, 60. 
47  BVerfGE 128, 109 (2011) paras 55-58. 
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principle. However, serious restrictions of the rights to sexual intimacy and 
self-determination are subject to a stringent standard of justification.48 
Moreover, as is clear from the third gender judgment, the fact that some 
individuals may feel offended or threatened by the recognition of gender 
identities very different from their own cannot be used to justify limitations 
of the rights of sexual minorities.49  
The judgments in question are characterised, first of all, by a radical 
understanding of sexual freedom. They refuse to inscribe the right to sexual 
self-determination into a binary system of gender classification or to 
condition it on conformity to dominant sexual norms. This construction of 
sexual freedom and the strict standard of justification applicable to 
limitations of the right to determine and shape one's own gender identity 
resemble Drucilla Cornell's notion of the imaginary domain. Cornell 
describes the imaginary domain as a heuristic device which can help us 
envisage a prior moral space of evaluation in which women and sexual 
minorities are included in the moral community of persons as an initial 
matter.50 Given their equivalent evaluation as sexed beings, women's 
subjectivity does not hinge on a comparison with men. Similarly, the self-
determination of members of sexual minorities is not conditioned on their 
conformity to roles and subject positions that are steeped in 
heteronormativity. This opens up a space for sexual self-determination in 
which all individuals, irrespective of their sex, gender identity or sexual 
orientation, have the right to be the source of their own sexual self-
presentations.  
Drawing on the idea of freedom articulated by Immanuel Kant, Cornell 
argues that this right is subject to only one condition: that a person must not 
infringe on the freedom of others to pursue their ends. She must harmonise 
her freedom with the freedom of others, and may resort to law to coerce 
others to "use their freedom in a way that harmonizes with her freedom".51 
Freedom may therefore be limited in order to ensure the freedom of others. 
However, the freedom of some may not be restricted to perpetuate the 
privilege of others. That would be the case where, for example, certain forms 
of sexuality are outlawed or legal recognition is withheld from certain gender 
identities on the basis that they offend the sensibilities and tastes of some 
sections of society. What is at stake in these cases is not the freedom of 
                                            
48  BVerfGE 60, 123 (1982) paras 40-42; BVerfGE 88, 87  (1993) paras 34-41; BVerfGE 
116, 243 (2006) paras 58, 60. 
49  1 BvR 2019/16 (2017) para 51. 
50  Cornell At the Heart of Freedom 14-15. 
51  Cornell At the Heart of Freedom 18, 191. 
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heterosexual men and women, but the privileging of their sexuality and 
gender identity at the expense of others. This negates the right of minorities 
to experience their sexuality and constitute their families differently, to do so 
openly, and to demand public recognition and equal support for their 
choices. Put differently, it denies them full recognition as members of the 
moral community, and results in a violation of the imaginary domain.52 
A second characteristic of this jurisprudence is its recognition of the 
interrelatedness of freedom and vulnerability. On the one hand, the Court is 
sensitive to the vulnerability of individuals who experience their sexuality in 
non-binary ways, while living in a society in which a binary understanding of 
sex and gender is considered the norm.53 As a result, it is attentive to the 
capacity of laws and practices to impede the self-realisation of members of 
sexual minorities, even in cases where those laws and practices appear 
neutral from a heteronormative perspective. Hence, the Court held that laws 
that deprive individuals of legal recognition for the gender with which they 
identify, or of the right to choose a name that expresses their experienced 
gender identity, or of the right to enter a legally recognised union with the 
person of their choice, or that condition these rights on the sacrifice of other 
interests that are constitutive of their personhood, have a particularly severe 
impact on their dignity and capacity for self-actualisation.  
On the other hand, the Court does not conceive freedom as an abstract 
property of individuals who are already autonomous, or as the absence of 
vulnerability. It sees it, rather, as something to be developed and nurtured 
through legal, social and economic arrangements that enable individuals to 
choose the kind of life that they have reason to value and to be true to their 
self-understanding.54 Moreover, it views freedom as something precarious, 
as it refers not to the autonomy of individuals whose identities are already 
fully formed, but to the chance to create a life that they can call their own 
from multiple and often contradictory experiences and struggles. To borrow 
again from Cornell, it could be said that on the Court's understanding, 
freedom is intimately connected to the processes through which persons 
individuate themselves. Those processes are characterised by vulnerability 
and require "legal, political, ethical, and moral recognition if [they are] to be 
effectively maintained".55  
                                            
52  Cornell At the Heart of Freedom 177. 
53  In relation to the social power inherent in the enactment of gender classifications and 
its impact on sexual minorities, see Butler Performative Theory of Assembly 32-35. 
54  See Sen Development as Freedom. 
55  Cornell At the Heart of Freedom 64. 
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Thirdly, the judgments in question articulate freedom with human dignity and 
equality. As mentioned above, the Court held, in many of these judgments, 
that there was a violation of article 2(1) (free development of the personality) 
in combination with article 1(1) (human dignity). It was further noted that 
these two provisions featured prominently in the Court's reasoning in cases 
decided on the basis of article 3 (equality). In addition, it could be argued 
that the Court's understanding of freedom in these cases is infused with the 
idea of equality. The right to freedom is sometimes relied on to entrench 
majoritarian norms, or to maintain the privilege of some at the expense of 
others. That happens not only in cases in which an appeal is made to the 
"right" of moral majorities not to be confronted with identities or relationships 
with which they are not comfortable, but also where it is debated whether 
certain "minority" rights should be recognised. For example, Völzmann 
points out that the right to the recognition of one's gender identity is 
sometimes treated as if it concerns only sexual minorities, when in fact the 
majority of the population already enjoy that freedom. She argues that the 
Court in the third gender judgment avoided this paternalistic mind-set, which 
is premised on assumptions about what is "normal", by relating freedom and 
equality to each other.56 Put differently, it is only by articulating freedom with 
the ideals of equality and equal human dignity that constitutional interpreters 
can hope to extricate freedom rights from legal and social hierarchies which 
confine the right to self-realisation to certain categories of persons.57  
5 Relevance for South Africa? 
How much persuasive value would the reasoning in the third gender 
judgment have if a similar case came before the South African courts? While 
a detailed comparison of the position in Germany and South Africa is 
beyond the scope of this article, it is worth pointing out that there are 
significant parallels between the German Basic Law and the South African 
Constitution. First, the South African Constitution not only treats human 
dignity, equality and freedom as foundational constitutional values, but also 
groups them together in a way which suggests that they are interdependent 
and mutually reinforcing.58 The Constitutional Court's jurisprudence 
                                            
56  Völzmann 2017 http://verfassungsblog.de/gleiche-freiheit-fuer-alle-zur-
freiheitsrechtlichen-begruendungdes-bverfg-in-der-entscheidung-zur-dritten-
option/.  
57  See Balibar Equaliberty for a fascinating account of the interdependence of freedom 
and equality. 
58  Sections 1(a) (the Republic of South Africa is founded on the values of "human 
dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and 
freedoms"), 7(1) (the Bill of Rights "affirms the democratic values of human dignity, 
equality and freedom"), 36(1) (limitations of the rights in the Bill of Rights are 
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confirms that these values are closely interconnected. The Court has held, 
for example, that human dignity and freedom are "inseparably linked";59 that 
the equal dignity of all human beings is at the heart of the prohibition of 
unfair discrimination;60 and that freedom and equality are closely related.61 
Its jurisprudence thus lends itself to the idea that individuals have the right 
to shape their sexual personae in accordance with their own experience and 
the life they value; that this right should be enjoyed equally by all; and that 
its limitation should be subjected to rigorous standards of justification.  
Admittedly, the South African Constitution differs from the German Basic 
Law to the extent that it does not contain an express guarantee of the right 
to free development of the personality. It could be argued that section 12, 
which safeguards the right to freedom and security of the person, should be 
interpreted to confer a general right to freedom which is not dissimilar from 
article 2(1) of the German Basic Law.62 However, even if this possibility is 
rejected, other constitutional guarantees can and have been used to protect 
a sphere of individual self-determination that is not covered by the specific 
freedoms guaranteed in the Constitution. As Frank Michelman has shown, 
the Constitutional Court has given the rights to dignity and privacy a broad 
interpretation to protect individuals against interference with their decisional 
freedom.63 In addition, section 12(2), which protects the right to bodily and 
psychological integrity, including the rights to make decisions concerning 
                                            
permitted only if they are "reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom") and 39(1) of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Bill of Rights must be interpreted to 
"promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom").  
59  Ferreira v Levin and Vryenhoek v Powell 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) para 49 (hereafter 
Ferreira). 
60  President RSA v Hugo 1997 6 BCLR 708 (CC) para 41. Also see Prinsloo v Van der 
Linde 1997 6 BCLR 759 (CC) paras 31-33; Harksen v Lane 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) 
paras 46, 50, 51, 53 and 91-92. 
61  MEC for Education: KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) paras 62-68 
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62  The majority of the Constitutional Court in Ferreira decided against giving an 
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63  Michelman "Freedom by any other Name?" 99-105, with reference to judgments like 
Dawood; Shalabi; Thomas v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) and 
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 1 SA 6 
(CC) (hereafter National Coalition). 
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reproduction and to security in and control over one's body, guarantees 
important aspects of a person's right to sexual self-determination. 
Secondly, the Constitutional Court has articulated dignity, equality and 
freedom with respect for sexual, religious and cultural difference. On this 
view, the recognition of the right of all persons to shape their individuality in 
accordance with their own ends presupposes respect for every individual's 
singularity and difference. This translates, inter alia, into the need for the 
legal recognition of different forms of sexuality and family formations,64 and 
a reasonable accommodation of the beliefs and customs of cultural and 
religious minorities.65 The emphasis on the importance of difference, both 
to the development of the individual personality and the health of democratic 
institutions,66 suggests that the Court may also be sympathetic to the claims 
of those who experience their gender in non-binary ways.  
Thirdly, Parliament has adopted legislation which signals its understanding 
that trans and intersex persons are vulnerable classes of persons in need 
of protection. Section 2(1) of the Alteration of Sex Description and Sex 
Status Act 49 of 2003 provides that certain categories of persons may apply 
for an alteration of the description of their sex on the birth register. The 
section allows a person's sex to be changed on the birth register not only in 
cases where a sex-change operation has been performed, but also in three 
other cases: where a person's sexual characteristics have been altered by 
medical treatment other than surgery (such as hormone replacement 
therapy) or "by evolvement through natural development resulting in gender 
reassignment", or where a person is intersex. To that extent, it takes a more 
liberal position than the German legislation, which requires surgery for a 
person's sex to be changed on the birth register, even though it allows trans 
individuals who have not had such surgery to change their names. 
Moreover, a 2005 amendment to section 1 of the Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 specifies that "sex" as a 
ground of discrimination includes "intersex", and adds a definition of 
"intersex" as "a congenital sexual differentiation which is atypical, to 
whatever degree". It thus makes it clear that discrimination on the basis of 
sex refers not only to discrimination against men or women, but also to 
discrimination against persons whose sexuality cannot be captured in binary 
terms. This is an important development, particularly since this Act is 
                                            
64  See National Coalition paras 22, 134; Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie 2006 1 SA 
524 (CC) para 60. 
65  Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope 2002 2 SA 794 
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H BOTHA PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  18 
constitutionally required legislation, which was adopted in terms of section 
9(4) of the Constitution to give effect to the constitutional right to equality.67 
Problems remain, despite these indications of a shift on the part of the 
legislature towards the recognition of the rights of trans and intersex people. 
In certain respects, the Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status Act 
remains steeped in assumptions that reflect dominant understandings of 
sexuality and gender and are at odds with the right to self-determination of 
sexual minorities. Perhaps most importantly, the alteration of a person's sex 
is still framed within binary terms, and does not provide a third option to 
those who identify as neither male nor female. In addition, the 
implementation of the Act leaves much to be desired. A study undertaken 
by Gender DynamiX and the Legal Resources Centre has identified several 
problems. These include the fact that, contrary to the provisions of the Act, 
the Department of Home Affairs sometimes rejects applications for the 
amendment of someone's sex on the basis that no proof was submitted that 
the applicant's sex had been changed through surgery.68 The study also 
points out that married applicants face a range of obstacles, which stem 
from the fact that neither the Marriages Act 25 of 1961 nor the Recognition 
of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 provides for same-sex marriage. 
The Department of Home Affairs has consequently required married 
couples to get divorced and then remarry under the Civil Union Act 17 of 
2006 in order for one of the spouses to change his or her sex on the 
marriage certificate. This would require them to claim an irretrievable 
breakdown of their marriage when, in fact, they wish to remain married.69 In 
a recent judgment, the Western Cape High Court held that this violated the 
spouses' rights to dignity, equality and administrative justice.70 
The binary system of gender classification that is used in South Africa 
seems inconsistent with the constitutional vision of an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, which requires 
respect for the many differences between individuals. Different mechanisms 
could be considered to cure this apparent constitutional defect. The first is 
to provide the option of leaving a child's sex description open. This could 
introduce a greater measure of flexibility, but would arguably fail to provide 
                                            
67  See Klein 2012 Ethnoscripts 12 22 on the significance of the inclusion of intersex.  
68  Gender DynamiX and Legal Resources Centre Date Unknown 
https://genderdynamix.org.za/wp-content/uploads/LRC-act49-2015-web.pdf 21-23. 
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a positive gender identification to intersex persons who identify as neither 
male nor female. It would thus continue to treat them as an anomaly. The 
second alternative, namely the introduction of a third gender category, 
seems better able to protect the dignity, equality and freedom of intersex 
persons – particularly if it is done with a degree of flexibility, in a way that 
respects the choices of intersex individuals who identify as male or female. 
This mechanism could be combined with the first one, thus enabling intersex 
persons to choose between male, female, a third option such as "diverse", 
or leaving the sex description open. However, even this is not a magic cure, 
as is evident from some of the reactions to the legislative response to the 
GFCC's intersex judgment, as referred to below. Thirdly, abolishing gender 
registration is the most radical alternative, which would remove the law's 
complicity in the marginalisation of sexual minorities. However, it should be 
preceded by a careful study of the implications that it would have for a wide 
range of laws and legal fields.  
6 Concluding remarks 
The GFCC's judgment in the third gender case is a milestone in the 
protection of intersex persons, which could have an important destabilising 
effect on binary conceptions of sex and gender. I have argued in this article 
that in certain respects the groundwork for this judgment was laid in a series 
of earlier cases on the rights of trans persons. These judgments introduced 
a degree of fluidity into the Court's understanding of sex and gender identity. 
Admittedly, the first trans judgment was still marked by certain essentialist 
assumptions and by its treatment of trans persons as a fairly homogenous 
group. However, subsequent judgments showed greater sensitivity to the 
differences among those labelled as trans, and resisted the conflation of 
gender identity with sexual orientation. Even though these judgments took 
the existence of a binary system of gender classification for granted, they 
arguably also helped to erode it – by acknowledging the variability of sex, 
gender identity and sexual orientation, and by recognising that gender 
identity does not simply turn on a person's physical sexual characteristics, 
but that personal experience and choice also play a significant role. Viewed 
through this lens, the third gender judgment represents an important further 
step in the radicalisation of sexual difference. It is best read not as an 
attempt to resolve the inconsistencies caused by a binary system of gender 
classification through the introduction of a third, more or less stable 
category, but as a multiplication of options, an opening up of new 
possibilities of gender identification, and an enlargement of the space for 
different sexual imaginations.  
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The third gender judgment's understanding of sexual freedom and its 
relationship with human dignity and equality also shows certain continuities 
with the trans judgments. I argued that the mutual articulation in these cases 
of dignity, equality and freedom resulted in a radical understanding of sexual 
self-determination. In the first place, the freedom to define one's own gender 
identity and sexuality is seen as a universal right which accrues to all 
individuals, regardless of whether or not they fit within a binary frame or 
conform to dominant sexual norms. Secondly, freedom is viewed not as the 
exclusive property of "self-sufficient" individuals, but as something that vests 
in every person, including those whose lives are marked by marginalisation, 
vulnerability and dependence. It denotes not the absence of vulnerability 
but, in the words of Lorraine Code, "climates of recognition" which will 
enable individuals to "live their vulnerabilities well".71 Respect for freedom 
requires laws that allow individuals to shape their individuality and develop 
their personality from their multiple and often contradictory commitments, 
experiences and struggles. Thirdly, freedom is distinguished from unjustified 
privilege, as sexual self-determination does not include the right to be 
shielded from the recognition of identities and sexualities different from 
one's own.  
There are important parallels between the vision of sexual self-
determination developed in the GFCC's judgments referred to above and 
South Africa's constitutional jurisprudence. South Africa's Constitution 
treats human dignity, equality and freedom as foundational values that are 
interrelated and interdependent. This vision requires all members of society, 
including those who are most marginalised and vulnerable, to have an equal 
right to shape their individuality in accordance with their own experience and 
understanding of what constitutes a good life. It also requires respect for 
every individual's singularity and difference. In addition, the South African 
legislature has recognised that trans and intersex persons are vulnerable 
minorities in need of protection. For these reasons, the GFCC's reasoning 
in cases concerning the rights of trans and intersex persons should have 
considerable persuasive force in South Africa.  
Despite my positive appraisal of the GFCC's reasoning in these judgments, 
a healthy dose of realism is called for. The legislative response to the 
intersex judgment is a reminder that traditional conceptions of sex and 
gender identity have a powerful hold on the legal and political imagination. 
On 15 August 2018 the German cabinet approved a Bill which, in seeking 
to give effect to the intersex judgment, introduces a third category called 
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"diverse".72 The Bill has drawn sharp criticism from organisations 
representing intersex and trans persons. One of the criticisms relates to the 
requirement that persons wishing to change their sex description must 
present medical evidence that confirms their intersex status. This is said to 
be at odds with the right of sexual self-determination, and with the GFCC's 
understanding that gender identity is not simply a matter of biological 
attributes, but also of a person's psychological makeup. Another criticism is 
that the government failed to take seriously the alternative option referred 
to by the Court, namely to scrap the sex entry. Critics point out that the 
reason offered by the government for not taking this option, namely that it 
would affect individuals' ability to prove their identity, is unconvincing. In the 
view of some gender activists and organisations, the abolition of gender 
registration is the only way in which sexual self-determination and equality 
can truly be realised.73 
In a society in which binary gender identities are considered the norm, trans 
and intersex persons face serious threats to their freedom, personhood and 
bodily and psychological integrity. Many intersex persons are subjected to 
surgery at a young age, which could cause severe physical and 
psychological trauma.74 Trans persons whose name or sex entry in the birth 
register does not match their physical appearance are subjected to serious 
infringements of their privacy and could be refused a range of services, both 
in the public and private sectors. Moreover, in South Africa sexual minorities 
experience high levels of assault, rape and murder.75 It would be naïve to 
assume that these issues could be resolved simply by recognising the rights 
of trans people to choose their gender identity, or by introducing a third 
option.76 For as long as lawyers, public servants, health professionals and 
citizens view traditional assumptions about sexuality and gender as natural 
and necessary, these problems are bound to recur. At the same time, 
however, we should not underestimate law's potential to legitimate or help 
transform the sexual status quo. For centuries, legal rules normalised the 
idea that every person is either male or female, that a person's sex is 
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immutable and established at birth, and that it is an important determinant 
of an individual's rights and duties. While laws and judgments that reject 
these ideas are unlikely to effect a sudden and wholesale change in societal 
attitudes, they could have an important destabilising effect in the longer run, 
and help multiply the spaces within which resistance is possible.  
Respect for the equal dignity and freedom of sexual minorities cannot be 
achieved simply through their formal inclusion within existing sexual roles 
and structures of recognition. Something more radical is needed, which 
shakes up existing distributions of sexual roles, transforms existing 
structures of recognition and opens up spaces in which multiple sexual 
imaginations and subject positions can flourish. That would require the 
deconstruction of sexual binaries and a decentring of the experiences of 
"straight" persons.77 Judgments like the one in the third gender case could 
provide significant impetus to such a radical form of sexual politics, 
particularly if they give rise to a thorough reconsideration of the role of sex 
and gender in the configuration of a person's civil status and the rights and 
duties flowing from that status. However, the obstacles remain formidable, 
given the hold of sexual binaries and heteronormative assumptions on our 
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